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a b s t r a c t
Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer
scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but – to date – this work has not
yet been properly presented in economics journals.We introducemechanized reasoning to economists in
threeways. First, we introducemechanized reasoning in general, describing both the techniques and their
successful applications. Second, we explain how mechanized reasoning has been applied to economic
problems, concentrating on the two domains that have attracted the most attention: social choice theory
and auction theory. Finally, we present a detailed example of mechanized reasoning in practice by means
of a proof of Vickrey’s familiar theorem on second-price auctions.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Mechanized reasoners automate logical operations, extending
the scope of mechanical support for human reasoning beyond
numerical computations (such as those carried out by a calculator)
and symbolic calculations (such as those carried out by a computer
algebra system). Such reasoners may be used to formulate new
conjectures, check existing proofs, formally encode knowledge,
or even prove new results. The idea of mechanizing reasoning
dates back at least to Leibniz (1686), who envisaged a machine
which could compute the validity of arguments and the truth of
mathematical statements. The development of formal logic from
1850 to 1930, the advent of the computer, and the inception
of artificial intelligence (AI) as a research field at the Dartmouth
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reasoners in the 1950s and 1960s.1
Since then, mechanized reasoning has been both less and more
successful than anticipated. In pure maths, mechanized reasoning
has helped prove only a few high-profile theorems. Perhaps
surprisingly – although consistent with the greater success of
applied AI over ‘pure’ AI – mechanized reasoning and formal
methods2 have enjoyed greater success in industrial applications,
as applied to both hardware and software design. In the past
1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Gardnerwas aheadof his time inmechanized reasoning
as well: four years before his regular columns with Scientific American began, his
first article for them included a template allowing readers to make their own
mechanized reasoners—out of paper.
2 The term formal methods is used here to denote approaches to establishing the
correctness ofmathematical statements to a precision that they can bemeticulously
checked by a computer. Rather than being seen as distinct from othermathematical
methods, researchers in the area see them as the next step in mathematics’ march
towards greater precision and rigour (Wiedijk, 2008). Consider: ‘‘A Mathematical
proof is rigorous when it is (or could be) written out in the first-order predicate
language L (∈) as a sequence of inferences from the axioms ZFC’’ (MacLane, 1986).
The advantages of taking this next stepwith computers include: a computer system
is never tired or intimidated by authority, it does not make hidden assumptions,
and can easily be rerun. A pioneer of mechanized reasoning – who saw himself
building on Bourbaki’s formalism – referred to computers as ‘‘slaves which are such
persistent plodders’’ (Wang, 1960).
icle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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methods to economics.
A central inspiration for this recent work are Geanakoplos’
three brief proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Geanako-
plos, 2005).3 Initially, Nipkow (2009), Wiedijk (2007), and
Wiedijk (2009) used theorem provers to encode and verify two
of Geanakoplos’ proofs. A subsequent generation of work, draw-
ing on the inductive proof of Arrow’s theorem in Suzumura (2000),
used formal methods to discover new theorems. Tang and Lin
(2009) introduced a hybrid technique, using computational ex-
haustion to show that Arrow holds on a small base case of two
agents and three alternatives, and then manual induction to ex-
tend that to the full theorem. By inspecting the results of the
computational step, they were able to discover a new theorem
subsuming Arrow’s. Tang and Lin (2011a) used this approach – ex-
haustively generating and evaluating base cases, and then using
a manual induction proof to generalize the results – to establish
uniqueness conditions for pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs
in two player static games; they published manual proofs of two
of the most significant theorems discovered this way in Tang and
Lin (2011b). Geist and Endriss (2011) used the approach to gener-
ate 84 impossibility theorems in the ‘ranking sets of objects’ prob-
lem (Barberà et al., 2004).
To date, the economics literature remains almost untouched by
research applying mechanized reasoning to economic problems.4
The one exception that we are aware of is Tang and Lin (2011b),
whose two theoremswere discovered computationally, but proved
manually.5 As it is our view that these tools will become
increasingly capable, this paper aims to introduce economists to
mechanized reasoning.6 It does so by means of three analytical
lenses, each with narrower scope but greater magnification than
its predecessor.
First, Section 2 presents an overview of mechanized reasoning
in general. We do so by setting out a classificatory scheme, with
the caveat that it should not be seen as implying a partition on the
field: interesting research will straddle boundaries, perhaps even
forcing them to be redefined.7
Second, Section 3 surveys the emerging literature applying
mechanized reasoning to economics. We structure this survey
primarily according to the problem domain within economics,
referring only secondarily to our classificatory scheme. We do this
to focus on the economic insights – primarily within social choice
and auction theory – made possible by these techniques, rather
than on the techniques per se.
Finally, to make this introduction more concrete, Section 4
provides an example of what mechanized reasoning looks like in
practice, presenting a blueprint of a mechanized proof of Vickrey’s
theorem on second-price auctions.We present such an established
theorem to focus attention on its implementation.
3 All three use Barberà’s replacement of Arrow’s decisive voter with a pivotal
voter (Barberà, 1980). Barberà (1983) also used this approach to find a direct proof
of the Gibbard–Sattherthwaite theorem.
4 A recent symposium on economics and computer science, involving central
figures at the interface between the disciplines, made no mention of mechanized
reasoning (q.v. Blume et al., 2015).
5 The process by which the theorems were discovered is described in Tang and
Lin (2011a,b) itself is all but silent on its mechanized origins.
6 For more general introductions, see Wiedijk (2008) and Avigad and Harrison
(2014). Harrison (2007) introduces mechanized reasoning alongside computer
algebra, presenting something of a unified view.
7 For example, we shall see that mechanized theorem discovery is usually
associated with inductive reasoning. However – in economic examples – the
most fruitful examples of theorem discovery (Tang and Lin, 2009, 2011a,b; Geist
and Endriss, 2011) have combined very simple deductive reasoning systems with
human intelligence.Section 5 concludes, and suggests some possible next steps for
mechanized reasoning in economics.
2. Mechanized reasoning
Our overview of mechanized reasoning distinguishes between
deductive and inductive systems. While the distinction has been
recognized at least since Aristotle, deductive reasoning – which
allows reliable inference of unknown facts from established facts
– has been in the focus of the mechanized reasoning community.
Inductive reasoning also generalizes from individual cases, but
does not restrict itself to reliable inferences; the cost of this
additional freedom is that its conjectures must then be tested.
2.1. Deductive reasoning
Historically, deductive reasoning systems were among the first
AI systems, dating back to the 1950s.While the origins of deductive
reasoning date to at least Aristotle, modern advances in this area
built on thework of logicians in the second half of the 19th century
and the start of the 20th (e.g. Whitehead and Russell, 1910). At
the Dartmouth Workshop in 1956, Newell and Simon introduced
the Logic Theorist, an automated reasoner which re-proved 38 of
the 52 theorems in chapter of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia
Mathematica (Whitehead and Russell, 1910).8
Abstractly, a deductive reasoner implements a logic – which is
comprised of a syntax defining well-formed formulae and a seman-
tics assigning meaning to formulae – and a calculus for deriving
formulae (called theorems) from formulae (called premises or ax-
ioms). Historically, subfields of mechanized reasoning have been
defined by choice of logic, calculus and problem domain. This sec-
tion provides a classificatory scheme based, first, on the choice of
calculus. Following the choice of calculus, a logic is chosen to bal-
ance expressiveness and tractability. Finally, the problem domain
itself will dictate some of the specialized features of a mechanized
reasoner.
When a mechanized reasoner applies the calculus’ permissible
operations to the axioms to obtain new, syntactically-correct
formulae it does not make use of the semantics: the semantics, or
ascribed meanings, yield models that may assist human intuition,
but which are not necessary to the formal process of reasoning
itself.9 Crucially, mechanized reasoning involves manipulating
symbols.10
Thus, mechanized deductive reasoning since the Logic Theorist
has seen reasoning as a search task for a syntactically well-defined
goal.11 Further, as the spaces through which search occurred was
potentially large, successful reasoningwould use heuristics to avoid
unprofitable sequences of operations. From this point of view,
8 According to McCorduck (2004), Russell himself ‘‘responded with delight’’
when shown the Logic Theorist’s proof of the isosceles triangle theorem, whose
proof was more elegant than their manual one.
9 Beginning with Euclid’s efforts to axiomatize geometry, logicians have
produced syntactical descriptions that make semantic references obsolete: Hilbert
allegedly said thatwewould still have an axiomatization of geometry if we replaced
the words ‘point’, ‘line’, and ‘plane’ by ‘beer mug’, ‘bench’, and ‘table’ (Hoffmann,
2013, p. 6).
10 That this was an insight at one point may be inferred from Turing’s famous
explanation that, ‘‘computing is normally done by writing certain symbols on
paper’’ (Turing, 1936).
11 As noted by Harrison (2007), specialist provers have also been developed for
particular problems for which more structured approaches than general search are
appropriate.
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chess computer, the premises’ intended semantic interpretations
are the board, its pieces and their positions; the calculus specified
permissible moves. A chess computer could then test manually
discovered solutions to chess puzzles by verifying that each move
satisfies the requirements of its calculus, with the final operation
yielding the goal-formula. More ambitiously, and interestingly,
chess programs discover solutions (e.g. sequences of winning
moves) by searching through permissible operations, with the
benefit of heuristics (e.g. regarding relative values of pieces).
A set of premises and a formula may be related in two different
ways. First, the semantic consequence relation describes situations
in which the formula follows from the premises: if the symbols in
the premises are interpreted in such a way that the formulae in
the premises are all true, then the formula is also true when the
symbols in it are interpreted in the sameway. Second, the syntactic
derivability relation describes situations in which the formula can
be derived from the premises: it is possible to generate the formula
from the premises by applying a fixed set of so-called calculus
rules. (An example of such a rule is modus ponens: From A and
A → B it is possible to derive B, where A and B may match any
formal expression). A proof that applies such rules, without any
appeals to intuition or to the reader filling in steps on her own, is
called a formal proof of the formula using the premises.
A calculus is called sound if only formulae can be derived from
the premises that actually follow from them. Deductive reasoning
is sound; inductive reasoning, considered below, is not.
A calculus is complete if it allows derivation of any formula
that follows from the set of premises. A calculus is decidable if,
for any set of premises and any formula, there is a procedure that
either derives the formula from thepremises or proves that no such
derivation exists; a calculus is semi-decidable if a procedure exists
that derives the formula from premises, whenever the formula
follows from them (but may not terminate if it does not).
Decidability typically depends on the expressiveness of the
logic used: more expressive logics model a richer set of concepts,
but are generally harder to manipulate. While ambitious exercises
in mechanized reasoning often begin by specifying a suitably
tailored logic,13 we largely restrict our attention to some of the best
known classical logics.14
Propositional (Boolean) logic: Propositional or Boolean logic, the
simplest classical logic, only uses propositional variables – which
are either true or false – and connectives such as ∧ (and), ∨ (or),
¬ (not), and→ (implies). An example of a propositional formula is
first_bidder_bids_highest ∧ second_bidder_bids_lowest.
Propositional logic can only make concrete, finite statements, but
has a sound, complete and decidable calculus.
An advantage of this decidability is that it may allow push-
button technology, which does not require specialist knowledge
in order to use. Once a problem is adequately represented a
corresponding system solves the problem fully automatically.
First-order logic: First-order logic (FOL) is more expressive. First,
it can speak about objects (e.g. ‘‘bidder b1’’) and their properties
(e.g. ‘‘bidder b1 wins auction’’, bidder(b1) ∧ wins (b1)). Second, ∃
and ∀ allow quantification over objects. For example, ‘‘every losing
bidder pays nothing’’ may be expressed as
∀i . bidder(i)→ (¬wins (i)→ pay (i) = 0). (1)
12 Indeed, Newell’s collaboration with Simon began after the latter became aware
of the former’s work on a chess machine.
13 See, for example, the judgement aggregation logic (JAL) of Ågotnes et al. (2011).
14 The 17 volumes in the second edition of Gabbay and Guenthner (2001/2014)
make clear that the classical logics are a small subset of all logics.Expressions like wins are called predicates, Boolean functions
which – when applied to their arguments – evaluate to either true
or false. Gödel’s completeness theoremproves that FOL has a sound
and complete calculus, but FOL has only semi-decidable calculi.
Furthermore, FOL is not expressive enough to express the finitude
or (per negation) infinity of the non-empty sets of objects.15
Many-sorted FOL uses sorts to extend first-order logic, not to add
to its expressiveness, but to allow more concise representations,
and – therefore – more efficient proving. Sorts restrict the
instantiation of variables to expressions of a certain sort. For
instance, sorts allow us to specify that variable i is a bidder, and
variable x a good. Formula (1) is then more precisely stated as:
∀ibidder .¬wins (i)→ pay (i) = 0. (2)
i (with the sort bidder mentioned only at the first occurrence) can
be instantiated nowby terms of sort bidder, but not by those of sort
good, thus reducing the search space for a proof. Sorted formulae
can be translated to unsorted formulae by converting the sorts to
unary predicates (which take a single argument).
Higher-order logic: Higher-order logic (HOL) enriches the expres-
siveness of FOL by extending quantification to predicates and func-
tions. It also allows predicates and functions to take certain16 other
predicates and functions as arguments. For example, bids, b, are
both a function frombidders to prices and an argument (alongwith
N, v and A) in the predicate
equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A.
Against this, HOL’s calculi are not decidable, and are – by Gödel’s
incompleteness theorem – incomplete.
Two common ways in which the classical logics (in particular,
FOL) are augmented are, first, by the addition of set theoretical
axioms and, second, by the addition of modal operators. The first
allows the approximation of higher order logic while maintaining
advantages of first order logic; the second allows logic to be applied
to modalities, such as knowledge, belief, or time.
Set theoretical axioms allow the definition of new symbols
and operations on both predicates (e.g. ∈ and ⊆) and functions
(e.g. ∪,∩ and ∅).17 They also allow the specification of properties
of sets (e.g. a ∉ X). Adding set theoretical axioms to FOL allows it to
weakly simulate HOL: functions can be expressed as relations over
X×X that are left-total and right-unique; predicates are expressed
as sets. While HOL is still more expressive than FOL augmented by
set theory (e.g., FOL cannot express inductive arguments), HOL’s
incompleteness means that there are true statements that can be
expressed in HOL but which may not have finite proofs. As FOL
augmented by set theory uses FOL, it remains complete by using
FOL’s complete calculus.
Modal operators – such as ‘next’ and ‘until’ – allow the consid-
eration of modes (or states in economic parlance). Linear temporal
logic (LTL) is a popular simple modal logic, modelling states in a
linear fashion, thus excluding the consideration of multiple possi-
ble future states. Kamp’s theorem established the equivalence of
LTL with a first-order logic. Another first-order approach to mod-
elling states is the situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969),
15 Thus, FOL could not express that only finitely many bidders participate in an
auction.
16 Unrestricted formula building leads to antinomies as discovered by Russell. The
introduction of types imposes a hierarchy on logical objects, including predicates.
This disables circular constructs such as X(Y ) := ¬Y (Y ), which – when Y is
instantiated with X – produces the set of all X for which X ∉ X , Russell’s famous
antinomy.
17 Constants such as ∅ are considered as a special case of functions, nullary
functions–functions that do not take any argument.
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Mechanized reasoning using deductive logics.
Decidable Undecidable
Logic SAT, CSP; description logic ITP, ATP
Computer system Model checking Program verification
which allows expression of states and the temporal development
of systems in first-order logic by representing the state as an ex-
tra argument of the formulae (e.g., that agent i has £10 in state s0
can be expressed as has(i, 10, s0)). By referring to the state abso-
lutely, rather than in relation to other states, the problem can be
expressed in standard FOL without recourse to specialized modal
relations.
Our final level of distinction is the domain of the problem; this
level will allow us to present concrete examples of the preceding.
Table 1 depicts these dimensions within deductive reasoning
systems.
Decidable logic: In Table 1, the decidable logic cell refers to
decidable calculi as applied to logical problems.
Boolean satisfiability problems (SAT) are among the simplest
canonical problems in propositional logic. They specify a (finite) set
of statements about a (finite) set of propositional variables, and ask
whether there exists an assignment of values (i.e. true and false)
to each of those variables that simultaneously satisfies all of the
statements.
In SAT problems, clauses of Boolean variables are typically ex-
pressed in conjunctive normal form, conjunctions (∧) of disjunc-
tions (∨) such as
(¬p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ ¬q) ; (3)
where p and q are Boolean variables, evaluating either to true or
false.18 Revisiting the example that in auctions the non-winning
player pays nothing, Eq. (1) can be translated for a finite number of
bidders (here, three) to a propositional logic formula,
(wins1 ∨ ¬pays1) ∧ (wins2 ∨ ¬pays2) ∧ (wins3 ∨ ¬pays3); (4)
stating for each of the three players separately that theywin or pay
nothing.
Any formula in propositional logic can be expressed in this
form, as can any formula in first-order logic when the domain is
restricted to a concrete finite domain (such as three bidders in an
auction). A SAT solver is used to try to assign the variables such
that all of the clauses are true. For instance, assigning wins1 and
pays1 to true and the other predicates to false shows that the single
formula (4) is satisfiable.
SAT problems are NP -hard (Karp, 1972), requiring – in the
worst case – trial of every possible input. Thus, while the logic and
calculi involved are simple, SAT problems may not be computable
in practice except in small cases. However, techniques have been
developed so that SAT solvers are able to solve typical cases very
quickly. One application area of SAT solvers are model checkers, as
described below.
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) are triples, ⟨V ,D, C⟩,
where V is a set of variables, D their domain, and C the constraint
set. In CSPs, the variables may take onmore values than in Boolean
satisfiability’s binary assignments. For example, an hours variable
might take one of twelve values. While apparently richer, CSPs can
be reduced to SATs by suitable definition of additional auxiliary
variables.19
18 The sentence given here is logically equivalent to p ≡ q, an equivalence
exploited by Tang and Lin (2011a) in their search for uniqueness conditions in
bimatrix games.
19 See Bordeaux et al. (2006) for a comparison of SAT and constraint programming.The third example of decidable calculi applied to logical
problems that we consider are description logics. These are central
to automated reasoning about concept hierarchies in classification
(or ontological) tasks. One of their most important applications is
to the semantic web, which allows computers to extract semantic
information from web pages. As a simple example, semantically
enabled web searches could recognize that x2 + y2 = z2 and
a = √c2 − b2 were both statements of Pythagoras’ theorem.20
Model checking:Model checking (Clarke et al., 1986, 1994) builds
finite models to describe computer hardware systems or simple
software systems and then tests their properties. Typical questions
include whether certain states of the system can be reached, or
whether information is flowing properly through a circuit design.
Such models are typically expressed as finite automata. A finite
automaton can model either a finite system or an infinite system
if abstraction allows the infinite state space to be simplified
to a finite one.21 Then the model is systematically checked for
desired properties, e.g. by using SAT solvers. Viewing digital
computer chips as a set of Boolean statements allows them to
be modelled as decidable computer systems allowing, in turn,
SAT solvers to automatically verify their properties. Since the
mid-1990s, Intel has used formal methods to formally prove
properties like ‘this chip implements the IEEE division standard’
following an embarrassing and costly recall of a Pentium chip
that was discovered not to properly implement IEEE floating point
division (Harrison, 2006). No further such problems have been
reported since then.22
Undecidable logic: The upper right cell in Table 1 refers to
the application of undecidable calculi to logical problems. The
two types of mechanized reasoning mentioned here, interactive
theorem proving (ITP) and automated theorem proving (ATP) have
traditionally been equated with theorem proving, but seen as
distinct, with the former involving more steering from a human
user than the latter. Stereotypically, an ITP system could check
an existing proof, while an ATP system could suggest steps in a
proof or, in some cases, a whole proof. In practice, the distinction
between the two has decreased, with ITP systems implementing
ATP procedures.23
The traditional identification of theorem proving with work
in these areas owes partly to some high profile successes in
pure mathematics, the focus of the most hope in mechanized
reasoning’s early days. The earliest major success was – as might
be expected in an emerging field – not even a clear example
of mechanized reasoning: in the 1970s, computers were used
to carry out the exhaustive computations required to prove the
four-colour map theorem (q.v. Appel and Haken, 1977; Appel
et al., 1977). Here, the computers were used to perform simple
(algebraic) calculations, rather than to (logically) ‘reason’. More
recently, mechanized proof checkers have confirmed these results
formally (q.v. Gonthier, 2008).24
20 See Lange (2013) for amore in-depth discussion of applications of semanticweb
technology to mathematics.
21 For example, in proofs involving real numbers, it may suffice to reduce an
infinite number of possible values – which cannot be handled by a decidable
calculus – to a trinary partition defined by >, < and =. See Burch et al. (1990) for
an application to large, complex microprocessor circuits.
22 With chip design becoming more and more sophisticated, the reasoning in the
verification needed to become also more sophisticated. Thus, HOL theorem provers
such as HOL-Light are now also used for hardware verification.
23 Harrison (2007) noted that ITP may be preferred to ATP, as – in working
more closely alongside human reasoning – it may be better at developing human
understanding.
24 Gonthier’s team has now also formally checked the Feit–Thompson Odd Order
Theorem (Gonthier et al., 2013).
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mechanized reasoning – rather than ‘mere’ calculation – was
Robbins’ conjecture that two bases for Boolean algebras are
equivalent. While appearing to be a beguilingly simple problem, it
remained unresolved for 60 years, becoming a favourite of Tarski,
who set it as an open problem (q.v. Henkin et al., 1971, p. 245).
One of the complicating factors of the conjecture was that the
only known example of a Robbins algebra was also a Boolean
algebra, reducing the evidence base that mathematicians could
use to form intuitions about the problem. Nonetheless, in the late
1990s, McCune (1997) was able to pose the problem in a way that
allowed EQP, an automated theorem prover related to his well-
known Otter prover, to generate – not just check – a 17-step proof,
later reduced to eight steps (McCune, 1997).25
Perhaps the highest profile success of mechanized reasoning
in pure mathematics is the solution to Kepler’s conjecture that
there is no denser packing of spheres in R3 than the face-
centred cubic. Hales’ original proof was 120 pages long (excluding
computer code that exceeded 500 MB), requiring a team of 12
referees five years to become ‘‘99% certain’’ that it was correct.
Unsatisfied with this standard, Hales founded Project Flyspeck to
establish a fully formal proof of the conjecture (Hales, 2012).
In August 2014, the project was completed (Hales et al., 2015),
close to Hales’s original estimate of 20 person-years (Avigad and
Harrison, 2014).
Moremundanely, ITP has been used to translate existing human
proofs into formal proofs that are sufficiently detailed that a
computer can mechanically verify them: as of January 2016, 91
of the ‘top 100’ mathematical theorems on a list maintained
by Wiedijk (2014) had been formalized.26 While most of these
are considerably less spectacular than the examples cited above
– in which theorem provers have been used to help convince
mathematicians as to the validity of major, new results – the
gradual accretion of small proof libraries builds a foundation for
applying ATPs more widely.
The distinction between high-profile, major theorems and
lower-profile bodies of theory has been suggested as a reason
that ATP has yet to fulfil its early hopes: Buchberger (2006)
noted that human mathematicians typically do not try to prove
isolated theorems but explore a whole theory, thereby building up
valuable intuition which helps them in proving related theorems.
Additionally, Newell (1981) stated that standard theorem proving
techniques – while often highly efficient – do not make use of
advanced human approaches (as described in Pólya’s books) such
as simplifying a problem to one they can solve; applying the
simplified solution to the original problem may still be very hard,
but the intuition gained by solving the simplified problem may
help solve the original problem.27
Program verification Table 1’s lower right cell corresponds
to software engineering’s program verification, reasoning about
software systems. This can be highly complex in the case of
complex programs. Within program verification, traditional proof
approaches have sought to prove that the software correctly
implements properties specified in the design brief. As such proofs
25 Dahn (1998)manually reworkedEQP’s proof to provide amore human-readable
proof.
26 Exceptions include Fermat’s last theorem.
27 Conversely, Dick (2011) observed that the ‘resolution’ inference rule (Robinson,
1965), central to mechanized reasoning, ‘‘was not based on any known human
practice and was in fact difficult and counterintuitive for humans to understand’’.
Indeed, reviewing mechanized reasoning since resolution, Robinson lamented that
it may have harmed mechanized reasoning by contributing to a parting of ways
between human mathematicians and mechanized reasoners (Dick, 2015).are very costly, full correctness proofs that seek to verify all
desired properties of the code, are done only for ‘mission critical’
systems (Vijay D’Silva Daniel Kroening, 2008).
Some well known examples of program verification have
come from transport and finance: in code controlling automated
commuter rail systems, theorems that no two trains occupy
the same location at the same time have been proved; within
financial transactions software, theorems that transactions do not
create or destroy value, but merely transfer it, have also been
proved (Woodcock et al., 2009). More recently, a compiler for
the C programming language has been formally verified (Boldo
et al., 2013). These techniques are becoming more mainstream:
in 2013, Facebook acquired Monoidics, a start-up firm applying
theorem proving to software code analysis; in 2015, another start-
up, Aesthetic Integration beat 600 competitors to win first prize
in UBS’ Future of Finance Challenge for its ability to automatically
prove failure or compliance in financial algorithms.28
Historically, program verification has been conducted as a post
mortem: given existing code, program verification determines
whether or not it is correct. More recently, code extraction
techniques have been developed to generate code that provably
implements the desired properties.
2.2. Inductive reasoning
As noted above, both inductive and deductive reasoning date
back at least to Aristotle, but the former is not sound, while the
latter has been the focus of the mechanized reasoning community.
The distinction between the two – as well as the utility of each –
was expressed by Pólya (1954, p. vi), who referred to deductive
reasoning as demonstrative reasoning, and inductive reasoning as
plausible reasoning:
We secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative
reasoning, butwe support our conjectures by plausible reasoning
. . . Demonstrative reasoning is safe, beyond controversy, and
final. Plausible reasoning is hazardous, controversial, and
provisional. . . .
In strict reasoning the principal thing is to distinguish a proof
from a guess, a valid demonstration from an invalid attempt. In
plausible reasoning the principal thing is to distinguish a guess
from a guess, a more reasonable guess form a less reasonable
guess. . . . [plausible reasoning] is the kind of reasoning on
which [a mathematician’s] creative work will depend.
Inductive systems seek to derive general statements based on a
finite number of statements (e.g. if A1 is true, and A2 is true, and
so on up to AN for some finite N , then An is true for all natural
numbers n).29 This sort of reasoning is immediately familiar to
us when we reflect on how we form conjectures: we expect the
sun to rise tomorrow without any understanding of astrophysics;
this expectation, though, may lead to the formation of conjectures
about astrophysics. However compelling the weight of evidence,
inductive reasoning is not sound—as may be demonstrated by
single counterexamples. In number theory, Euler’s attempted
generalization of Fermat’s last theorem remained open for two
28 Their entry formally defined a UBS ‘dark pool’ and a set of SEC regulationswhich
the SEC had found the dark pool in breach of. Aesthetic Integration was able not
only to verify the dark pool failure found by the SEC, but discovered that its order
prioritization failed to satisfy transitivity (Ignatovich and Passmore, 2015).
29 Inductive reasoning is distinct from mathematical induction, which involves
proving A0 and that An+1 is true given An . Mathematical induction is a sound
deductivemethod.
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Some applications of mechanized reasoning to economic problems.
Decidable Undecidable
Logic Geist and Endriss (2011), Brandt and Geist (2016): SAT Nipkow (2009), Wiedijk (2007), Wiedijk (2009), Lange et al.
(2013): ITP
Tang and Lin (2009): SAT, CSP Grandi and Endriss (2012): ATP
Bai et al. (2014): description logic
Computer system Xu and Cheng (2007), Arcos et al. (2005), Tadjouddine et al. (2009): model
checking
Caminati et al. (2015): code extractioncenturies until a computer found a counterexample.30 In game
theory, Neumann and Morgenstern conjectured that stable sets
(‘solutions’ in their parlance) always existed; it took almost a
quarter-century for counterexamples to be found (Lucas, 1968).
Inductive reasoning may be used for theorem discovery,
whereby regularities in observed data are used to form conjectures
to test.31
Mechanized inductive reasoning dates back to two systems
built in the 1970s and 1980s to discover new conjectures, AM
(Automated Mathematician) (Lenat, 1976) and Eurisko (Lenat,
1983). These were able to detect conjectures such as the unique
prime factorization theorem and Goldbach’s conjecture.32 The
systems use certain measures of interestingness for concepts.
For instance, concepts that are always true or always false are
not interesting. However, if a concept is true for a significant
proportion of examples (such as divisibility by only 1 and the
number itself) then this is considered as an interesting concept
(‘primality’ for divisibility by only 1 and the number itself).33
Lenat’s work was continued by Colton in the HR (Hardy–
Ramanujan) system (Colton et al., 1999), where more advanced
measures for interestingness were developed. For instance,
The novelty measure of a concept calculates how many times
the categorisation produced by the concept has been seen. For
example, square numbers categorise integers into two sets:
{1, 4, 9, . . .} and {2, 3, 5, . . .}. If this categorisation had been
seen often, square numbers would score poorly for novelty, and
vice-versa (Colton et al., 2000).
Another important advance in Colton’s work is that the HR system
weeds out simple conjectures, namely those that can be easily
verified or falsified by automated theorem provers.34 One of the
successes of HR was that it invented the concept of ‘integers
with a square number of divisors’ which was added to Sloane’s
Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences.35
30 Euler’s conjecture states: let n and k be integers greater than one, and let
a1, . . . , an and b be non-zero integers; then
n
i=1 a
k
i = bk
 ⇒ (n ≥ k). The first
known counterexample, found by computer, is 275 + 845 + 1105 + 1335 =
1445 (Lander and Parkin, 1966).
31 One of the most dynamic subfields of AI currently is machine learning. Some
definitions are agnostic as to how the machines learn – e.g. whether deductively
or inductively – while, perhaps more typically, others link machine learning more
closely to inductive reasoning. Some of the highest profile applications of machine
learning are statistical, positing rules that fit the existing data well, rather than
perfectly.
32 The prime factorization theorem states that any positive integer has a unique
decomposition as the product of primes. Goldbach’s conjecture states that every
even integer beyond two can be expressed as the sum of two primes.
33 Dick’s case study of the Argonne National Laboratory’s AURA system noted that,
while ‘‘the capacity to identify what was ‘promising’ or ‘interesting’ was precisely
one of those unautomatable human abilities . . . the Argonne practitioners decided
what was important on the basis of extensive experimenting with AURA’’.
34 See also the introduction of Tang and Lin (2011a) for a brief reviewof the history
of mechanized theorem discovery; a lengthier review is available in Tang (2010).
35 https://oeis.org/.3. Mechanized reasoning for economic problems
Over the past decade, computer scientists have become inter-
ested in economic problems—often publishing economically novel
and interesting results, but almost entirely within the computer
science literature. This section reviews that literature, focusing on
the applications to social choice and auction theory. We struc-
ture this survey primarily according to the problem domainwithin
economics, and only secondarily according to our classificatory
scheme, in order to focus on the insights into economic problems
made possible by these techniques, rather than the techniques
themselves.
Table 2 places the papers reviewed in this section into our
original classificatory scheme. This classification is imperfect.
For example, Tang and Lin (2009) and Geist and Endriss (2011)
both used propositional logic solvers (and, therefore, deductive
reasoning), but used them to discover new results—which we
have associated, above, with inductive reasoning. Papers like this
therefore span historical distinctions.
Social choice has been mechanized reasoning’s main point of
contactwith economics,making it a convenient lens for illustrating
mechanized reasoning. Auction theory is, we feel, promising
as a new point of contact between mechanized reasoning and
economics, due both to the technical parallels between social
choice (where mechanized reasoning has proved fruitful) and
mechanism design (q.v. Reny (2001)), and to auctions’ importance
as allocation mechanisms.
3.1. Social choice
Geanakoplos’ three brief and distinct proofs of Arrow’s impossi-
bility theorem – that, for three or more alternatives and a finite set
of agents, there is no social choice rule satisfying unanimity (UA),
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and non-dictatorship
(ND) – served as the mechanized reasoning community’s entrée to
economic problems: social choice was novel to this community,
yet used familiar structures – particularly linear orders – and the
three proofs by Geanakoplos (2005) gave the mechanized reason-
ing community an opportunity to attempt to compare the relative
difficulty of encoding those proofs for computers.
One primitivemeasure of the relative difficulty of formal proofs
is to compare their size to that of human proofs.36 Table 3 reports
on the relative sizes of Nipkow’s proofs in Isabelle – a higher-
order logic theorem prover – and Wiedijk’s proof37 in Mizar – a
set theoretic proof checker, which augments first-order logic by
36 The easiest way of determining the size of a formal proof is by counting lines of
source code. In Section 4 we discuss a less biased measure, the de Bruijn factor.
37 Wiedijk justified his decision to formalize only Geanakoplos’ first proof by
noting that they became successively more abstract, making the first the most
challenging as, generally ‘‘abstract mathematics is easier to formalize than concrete
mathematics’’ (Wiedijk, 2009).
32 M. Kerber et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 66 (2016) 26–39Table 3
Relative lengths of human and machine proofs of Arrow’s theorem.
1st proof 3rd proof
Paper (Geanakoplos, 2005) 1 page 1 page
Isabelle (Nipkow, 2009) 350 lines (6 pages) 300 lines
Mizar (Wiedijk, 2007, 2009) 1100 lines
the axioms of Tarski–Grothendieck set theory.38 Nipkow (2009)
attributed the greater length of the Mizar proofs to Isabelle’s
‘‘higher level of automation’’—something towhichwe return in our
Isabelle proof of Vickrey’s theorem.
Nipkow’s formalization attempts began with Geanakoplos
(2001), a working paper that preceded the published ver-
sion (Geanakoplos, 2005). In seeking to formalize the first proof,
he discovered a statement in one of the lemmas that required a
20 line auxiliary proof to properly establish. Further, a relationship
between a pivotal voter and a dictator only ‘‘hinted at’’ in the orig-
inal text required elaboration. Nipkow did not discover any errors
in this first proof. Similarly, Wiedijk (2009) reported on missing
cases, but no ‘‘real errors’’.
As to the third proof, Nipkow found two instances of omitted
material in its central lemma, preventing him from formalizing the
proof. Nipkowpresented these concerns to Geanakoplos by e-mail;
both concerns were resolved in Geanakoplos (2005).39
Both Nipkow andWiedijk’s proofs were written by the authors
themselves, and are therefore examples of ITP. By contrast, Grandi
and Endriss (2012) sought to, first, restate Arrow’s theory in FOL
and, then, to automatically generate a proof for it.40 Expressing
Arrow’s theory in FOL presented the challenge that quantifying
over all possible linear orders of agents’ preference profiles appears
to be a second-order quantification as it involves quantifying over
agents, alternatives, and the agents’ preference profiles. Grandi and
Endriss addressed this by adopting the approach taken in Tang and
Lin (2009), namely to apply the situation calculus (mentioned in
Section 2.1) for the representation. Thus, they could present a first-
order formalization of the requisite axioms, TARROW , allowing them
to restate Arrow’s theorem as:
Theorem 1 (Arrow à la Grandi and Endriss, 2012). TARROW has no
finite models.
A model in this sense is an instantiation (or example) of the
variables used in the theory. For Arrow’s theorem, the variables
include N (the set of agents), A (the set of alternatives), the set
of the agents’ preference profiles, and the set of social welfare
functions (SWFs)mapping fromsuchprofiles to a social preference.
In the two-agent, three-alternative case, that TARROW ‘‘has no finite
models’’ means that none of the 636 possible SWFs satisfy the
theory’s axioms.41 The theorem claims this property for any finite
number of agents, and any finite number of alternatives in excess
of three.
38 The advantage of Tarski–Grothendieck set theory over Zermelo–Fraenkel is that
the former only requires finitely many axioms to axiomatize sets.
39 Mechanized reasoning can identify omissions by forcing close scrutiny. This, of
course, is also possible without mechanical support. For example, in the matching
literature, Aygün and Sönmez (2013) identified a hidden assumption in Hatfield
andMilgrom (2005) – which they view as ‘‘widely considered to be one of the most
important advances of the last two decades in matching theory’’ – without which
many of their results fail to hold. The oversight arose from ‘‘an ambiguity in setting
the primitives of the model’’. This ambiguity would likely have been detected by a
mechanized reasoner as well.
40 Grandi and Endriss (2012) is also a good guide to related work on formalizing
results in social choice.
41 There are a total of 36 preference profiles in the domain, and six orders in the
range, yielding a total of
36
i=1 6.FOL’s completeness allows any property of the system to be
explicitly derived. However, the second problem with FOL en-
countered by Grandi and Endriss is that FOL is unable to express
finitude, for the same reason that it cannot express induction: in-
tuitively, HOL defines finitude by considering the complement of
the infinite, which it can define by induction on the natural num-
bers. Thus, formulating Arrow’s Theorem in FOL requires a separate
formulation for each |N|. Similarly, proofs of Arrow’s theorem in
FOL may differ for each |N|. Thus, Grandi and Endriss’ attempts to
use a first-order theorem prover to automatically generate proofs
of Arrow’s theorem failed outside of minimal cases.42
Independently of Geanakoplos’ proofs, Suzumura (2000) had
presented an induction proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem for
a base case of two agents and |A| alternatives; an induction result
then demonstrated its truth in general. This motivated Tang and
Lin (2009) to manually derive a second induction result in the
number of agents. Proving the impossibility in a two-agent, three-
alternative base case, would – by their two induction lemmas –
cause it to hold in general. They computationally exhausted this
base case in two different ways.
First, they expressed the problem as a Boolean SAT prob-
lem. Tang and Lin then used the situation calculus, which allows
many of the problem’s symmetries to be efficiently dealt with by
the action of swapping arguments, to reduce the number of vari-
ables needed in the base case to 35,973 in 106,354 clauses. These
are too many cases to check manually. However, using the SAT
solver Chaff2 they could show the inconsistency between the three
basic axioms in less than a second on a desktop computer.
Second, Tang and Lin expressed the problem as a CSP, in which
V , the set of variables, consists – in their base case – of 36
preference profiles;D, their domain, of six linear orderings for each
profile; and C , their constraint set, of the UN and IIA axioms. As
the base case implies 636 ≈ 1028 possible SWFs – far too many
to be feasibly generated – the authors used the (first-order) logical
programming language Prolog to generate all SWF satisfying the
constraints of UN and IIA. Running in less than a second on a
desktop computer, their Prolog code generated two SWFs, both of
which were also dictatorial.
A similar approach yielded the Muller–Satterthwaite theorem,
and Sen’s Paretian liberal result, among others.43
When implementing the CSP, the authors noticed that imposing
even just the IIA constraint reduced the set of SWFs from 636 to
94. By inspecting these manually, Tang and Lin (2009) posited
a new theorem that implies both Arrow’s and Wilson’s. Before
stating it, note that a social order is inversely dictatorial if it ranks
elements in the opposite way to at least one agent; the Kendall tau
distance between two orderings is the number of pairs on which
they disagree. Then:
Theorem 2 (Tang and Lin, 2009). If a social welfare function W on
(N, A) satisfies IIA, then for every subset Y of A such that |Y | = 3,
1. WY is dictatorial, or
2. WY is inversely dictatorial, or
3. The range of WY has at most 2 elements, whose [Kendall tau]
distance is at most 1.
As an example of an SWF accepted under condition 3 of
theorem, consider the function that always prefers the first
alternative to the second, always prefers the first to the third, and
prefers the second to the third alternative unless both agents prefer
42 They used Prover9, a successor to Otter, and – therefore – a close relative of the
system that found the proof of Robbins’ conjecture (McCune, 1997).
43 See Geist (2010) for a more complete list.
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dictatorial: the agents’ preferences for the first item are ignored;
there are only two elements in its range (e.g. a ≻ b ≻ c and
a ≻ c ≻ b), the distance between which is one.44 As Tang and
Lin noted, the third case of their result violates Arrow’s original
non-imposition axiom, which requires that the SWF be surjective,
mapping to every possible value in its range.
Of the 94 SWFs satisfying IIA, there are 84 of the sort described
above, 6 constant SWFs (one for each ordering), two dictatorial
functions, and two inversely dictatorial functions.
As before, the theorem is established by exhaustive compu-
tation on the two-agent, three-alternative base case, and then
extended to arbitrary finite domains by the manually-derived
induction lemmas. Chatterjee and Sen (2014) observed that, as far
as they were aware, this is the ‘‘only Arrow-type result in the liter-
ature that does not use an axiom other than IIA’’, an achievement
that they believe ‘‘could not have been conjectured without com-
putational aid’’.45
Social choice is replete with characterization and impossibility
results. Geist and Endriss (2011) applied the Tang and Lin (2009)
approach to the problem of ranking sets of objects (Kannai and
Peleg, 1984), for which Barberà et al. (2004) supplied almost 50
possibly desirable axioms.46
Rather than deriving an induction lemma for every base case
of interest, they derived a broadly applicable induction theorem
based on model theory’s Łoś–Tarski preservation theorem, which
describeswhenproperties (ϕ, below) are retained in substructures,
namely essentially when the theory can be expressed using
universal quantifiers in the form ∀x . ϕ.47
Furthermore, as they wished to distinguish between individual
alternatives, sets of preferences, and preference orders the authors
used a many-sorted FOL. Many-sorted FOL also allows relations
(including set inclusion or union) to be defined on one domain that
do not hold on the other.
Geist and Endriss then encoded 20 axioms drawn from Barberà
et al. (2004) in their many-sorted FOL. As their induction result
translated impossibilities generated on small, finite domains to
full-blown impossibility results, they took advantage of these
concrete, finite base cases to re-write the axioms in propositional
logic (using the kind of rewriting that transformed formula (1)
to formula (4) in Section 2.1). This, in turn, allowed them to
use SAT solvers to search for subsets of axioms which generate
impossibility results in these base cases; once found, the induction
theorem generalized them to full impossibility results. Doing so
for all base cases up to sets of eight items yielded 84 impossibility
theorems from about one million combinations.48
44 Represent preferences over three objects as a three-digit binary character, the
first indicating whether a ≻ b, the second whether a ≻ c and the third whether
b ≻ c. There are six permissible three digit numbers, 000, 001, 011, 100, 110 and
111, after eliminating the two cyclical ones. IIA then requires that each digit in
the social preference is a function of the corresponding digits in the individual
preferences alone. The 1-distance condition then allows only one of those digits
to vary.
45 In private correspondence, Sen has conjectured that the result of Malawski
and Zhou (1994) linking Wilson’s and Arrow’s theorems may be an immediate
consequence of Tang and Lin’s.
46 Geist (2010) had initially attempted an approach more akin to Grandi and
Endriss (2012), seeking to derive an automated proof of the Kannai and Peleg
theorem using three different first-order theorem provers; none of them was able
to derive a proof after 120 h of CPU time on 2.26 GHz machines with 24 GB RAM.
47 As a trivial example, the property that a structure contains three distinct
elements cannot be preserved in substructures with fewer than three elements.
48 Resource constraints limited them to eight items and 20 axioms. They derived
their results in about one day.Their results included known results (e.g. those of Kannai
and Peleg (1984) and Barberà and Pattanaik (1984)); variations
on known results, typically formed by strengthening axioms to
reduce the impossibility’s minimal domain; direct consequences
of other results (as they did not prune implications of existing
impossibilities); a trivial contradiction between the axioms of
uncertainty aversion and uncertainty appeal; and – perhaps most
interestingly – new theorems. These last resolved an open question
in the literature, which we now describe.
Letting ≻ (resp. %) denote strict (resp. weak) preference on
individual choice objects (denoted by lower case letters), and ◃
(resp. D) strict (resp. weak) preference on sets of objects (denoted
by capital letters), Bossert et al. (2000) presented a theorem
characterizing the min–max ordering in terms of four axioms. The
min–max ordering is defined as
ADmnx B ⇔ [min {A} ≻ min {B} ∨ (min {A} = min {B}
∧max {A} % max {B})] ;
where min {A} is the minimal element of A with respect to % and
max {A} the maximal element. Thus, a set A is weakly preferred
under the min–max ordering to set B iff either the worst element
of A is strictly preferred to that or B, or (when the worst elements
are equally preferred) the best element of A is weakly preferred to
that of B.
The four axioms were:
1. Simple dominance,
x ≻ y ⇒ ({x} ◃ {x, y} ∧ {x, y} ◃ {y})
for all x and y, so that a set consisting of a strictly preferred
object is preferred to a set containing it as well as a strictly
less preferred object, which – in turn – is preferred to a set
consisting only of that less preferred object.
2. Independence,
A ◃ B ⇒ A ∪ {x} D B ∪ {x}
for all A and B and x not contained in A or B. Thus, adding a single
object to two sets ranked by strict preference does not reverse
that ranking (but it may weaken it).
3. Uncertainty aversion,
(x ≻ y ≻ z)⇒ {y} ◃ {x, z}
for all x, y and z, so that a set consisting only of an intermedi-
ately preferred object is strictly preferred to a set consisting of
a strictly more favourable and a strictly less favourable object.
4. Simple top monotonicity,
x ≻ y ⇒ {x, z} ◃ {y, z}
for all x, y and z such that x ≻ z and y ≻ z, so that – if an object
is strictly preferred to another – a set containing it and a third
object is strictly preferred to a set containing the less preferred
object and the third object.
Arlegi (2003) showed that the min–max ordering was, in fact,
inconsistentwith the independence axiom, and presented an alter-
native axiomatic basis for it. Geist and Endriss (2011) presented a
complementary result to Arlegi’s, finding a contradiction between
the four original axioms at even four choice objects, thus establish-
ing that the original four axioms are inconsistent, so cannot form
the basis of any transitive binary relationship.
Geist and Endriss (2011) also presented the first impossibility
result in this literature not to use any dominance axiom.
In cases of interest, the authors were able to quickly derive
manual proofs for the computationally discovered results.49
49 For the min–max ordering inconsistency, the manual proof is about a half-page
long.
34 M. Kerber et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 66 (2016) 26–39Finally, the large set of impossibility results allowed the authors
to statistically consider the role of the various axioms. For example,
the linear order axiom appeared in all theorems; the ‘even-
numbered extension of equivalence’ and reflexivity occurred in
none; ‘intermediate independence’ occurred in all results for seven
or eight choice items, but never for fewer than five choice items.
Brandt andGeist (2016) extended themethodology of Geist and
Endriss (2011) by performing an initial encoding in HOL, and then
deriving implications capable of expression in propositional logic
for small base cases. This allowed expression of more properties
than was possible in the many-sorted FOL of Geist and Endriss
(2011). Thus, Brandt and Geist (2016) could encode a neutrality
axiom that Geist and Endriss (2011) could not, but at the cost of
generating exponentially many new variables, restricting the size
of cases that could be computed.
3.2. Auctions
Applications of mechanized reasoning to auction design and
implementation are less sophisticated than those to social
choice. Nevertheless, given auctions’ practical importance, we
expect that these will ultimately become more widespread. This
section surveys work in two separate areas—applying mechanized
reasoning to checking results in auction theory, and checking
implementations of auction designs.
On the former, Vickrey’s theorem has provided a basic testbed
result. Section 4 illustrates in detail our Isabelle implementation.
It therefore complements Lange et al. (2013), which compared im-
plementations of Vickrey’s theorem in four different mechanized
reasoners.
Conceptually, as higher-order logic is sufficient to express all
concepts in auction theory, it is not challenging to represent
basic results in auction theory using a higher-order logic theorem
prover like Isabelle. Doing so in more basic logics is both
more conceptually challenging, and may offer more promise of
automation.
In simpler logics, model checking can automatically establish
properties of systems by exhaustively inspecting the system’s
state space. Tadjouddine et al. (2009) used SPIN, a widely-used
commercial model checker based on a linear temporal logic
(LTL), to verify Vickrey auctions’ strategy-proofness property that
bidders cannot do better than to bid their valuations.50 They
implemented two techniques to reduce the search space while
verifying strategy-proofness for arbitrary bid ranges and numbers
of agents: program slicing removed variables irrelevant to the
property; abstraction discretized the domain of bids into a three-
element domain, depending on whether a bid exceeded, equalled,
or was less than an agent’s valuation. A manual proof was
required to establish the abstraction’s soundness. Together, the
two simplifications allowed strategy-proofness to be verified for
any number of agents in a Vickrey auction in a quarter of a second.
The second branch of applications of mechanized reasoning to
auctions has sought to establish properties of auction designs as
implemented. This is of interest for at least two reasons: first,
even if theoretical properties of an auction are known, errors
may be introduced when translating the auction from a design to
an operational auction. Second, and more commonly for modern
auctions, practice may simply outstrip theory. In both cases,
50 Tadjouddine et al. (2009) did not seem to use the modal capabilities of SPIN;
instead, the authors seemed to adopt SPIN as they wished – in future work – to be
able to accept C code as input, and to reason about it; reasoning about computer
programs in which variables can be set does require modal capability.mechanized reasoning can be used to reduce the likelihood that
an auction will fail when run.
Caminati et al. (2015) used Isabelle to prove that a combina-
torial Vickrey auction is soundly specified, in the sense of guar-
anteeing that – whatever the bids received as input – the output
allocated only the available goods, at non-negative prices, and as-
signed a unique output to each input. Furthermore, it implemented
two parallel specifications of the auction, the first close to its stan-
dard paper specification, and the second a constructive one. Con-
structive definitions are essentially algorithmic descriptions. By
contrast, definitions in classical logics need only state properties of
the defined object. For instance, a classical definition of the maxi-
mum of a (non-empty) list of bids identifies an element of the list
that is greater than or equal to every other element in the list. A
constructive definition would begin by noting that – for a one-
element list – the maximum is the single element of the list; it
would then proceed recursively by computing themaximumof the
remainder of the list. It would then return the larger of the two: the
initial element, or the maximum of the remaining elements.
Isabelle was used to formally prove the equivalence of the two
specifications.While the constructive specification is less intuitive,
its algorithmic nature allows Isabelle to automatically generate
verified executable code from it.
Model checking has also been used to examine auctions for
evidence of shill bidding. Xu and Cheng (2007) used SPIN to
define predicates corresponding to suspicious behaviour, including
pushing prices to a reserve price before dropping out, and bidding
on the higher priced of two identical goods. Themodel checkerwas
then used to see whether the predicates were present in a finite
dataset of actual bidding behaviour.
Arcos et al. (2005) developed a toolkit to verify properties of
multi-agent environments, with a traditional open outcry auction
as their leading example. Their toolkit implemented liveness
checks to ensure that agents are not blocked (i.e. can bid in
every round), that each bidding round can be reached, and that
the final bidding round is reachable from any other, as well as
correctness of the bidding language (that is, that by following the
rules, the system always remains in a defined state). Their toolkit
also includes a simulation tool that conducts a ‘what-if’ analysis
by performing a complete check of all cases. While the authors
themselves do not refer to what they do as model checking, that
is what it most closely resembles.
Finally, Bai et al. (2014) consider the question of how potential
users of online auctions can trust the auctions’ protocols. They
develop a protocol for specifying auction designs that can be read
by Coq, a mechanized reasoner. Future work building on this
should eventually allow Coq to verify properties claimed for the
auction.
4. Blueprint of a formal proof of Vickrey’s theorem
The preceding has provided an overview of mechanized
reasoning, both in general, and as applied to economic problems.
This section provides a detailed description of how a mechanized
reasoner is used in practice, in this case to verify a formal proof
of Vickrey’s theorem. We use Vickrey’s familiar theorem to focus
attention on the formal proof’s implementation, rather than the
details of the result or proof.
We begin with a standard statement of Vickrey’s theorem and
proof, in this case from Maskin (2004):
Theorem 3 (Vickrey 1961). In a second-price auction, it is (weakly)
dominant for each buyer i to bid its valuation vi. Furthermore, the
auction is efficient.
M. Kerber et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 66 (2016) 26–39 35Fig. 1. High level theory graph for the formal proof of Vickrey’s theorem.Proof #1. Suppose that buyer i bids bi < vi. The only circumstance
in which the outcome for i is changed by its bidding bi rather than
vi is when the highest bid b by other bidders satisfies vi > b > bi.
In that event, buyer i loses by bidding bi (for which its net payoff
is 0) but wins by bidding vi (for which its net payoff is vi − b).
Thus, it is worse off bidding bi < vi. By symmetric argument, it
can only be worse off bidding bi > vi. We conclude that bidding
its valuation (truthful bidding) is weakly dominant. Because it is
optimal for buyers to bid truthfully and the high bidder wins, the
second-price auction is efficient. 
However intelligible to humans, Maskin’s proof is too stylized
for computers: that there is only one circumstance inwhich chang-
ing bids changes the outcome is merely asserted; the ‘‘symmetric
argument’’ is not explicitly elaborated. Before formalizing it, we
therefore elaborated the paper proof, and restructured it to four
cases, rather than the original nine:
Proof #2. Let N be the set of bidders, and suppose bidder i bids
bi = vi, whatever bj each other bidder j ≠ i bids. There are two
cases:
1. iwins. This implies bi = vi = maxj∈N

bj

, pi = maxj∈N\{i}

bj

,
and ui (b) = vi − pi ≥ 0. Now consider i submitting an
arbitrary bid bˆi ≠ bi so that the bid vector is

b1, . . . , bi−1, bˆi,
bi+1, . . . , bn

. This has two sub-cases:
(a) i wins with bˆi, so that ui

b1, . . . , bi−1, bˆi, bi+1, . . . , bn

=
ui (b): i receives the same utility from winning the item,
and pays the same price as the second highest bid has not
changed.
(b) i loses with bˆi, so that ui

b1, . . . , bi−1, bˆi, bi+1, . . . , bn

=
0 ≤ ui (b).
2. i loses. This implies pi = 0, ui (b) = 0, and bi ≤ maxj∈N\{i}

bj

as, otherwise, iwould have won. This yields again two cases for
i’s alternative bid bˆi:(a) i wins, so that ui

b1, . . . , bi−1, bˆi, bi+1, . . . , bn

= vi −
maxj∈N\{i}

bj
 = bi −maxj∈N\{i} bj ≤ 0 = ui (b).
(b) i loses, so that ui

b1, . . . , bi−1, bˆi, bi+1, . . . , bn

= 0 =
ui (b).
By analogy for all i, b = v supports an equilibrium in weakly
dominant strategies. Efficiency is immediate: the highest bidder
has the highest valuation. 
To formally prove Vickrey’s theorem, we used Isabelle, whose
higher-order logic allows our formalization to remain close to
paper mathematics.
Our proof, Vickrey.thy, is a 9 KB, 185 line file that draws on five
ancillary fileswritten for this project.51 All six files amount to 17KB
and 404 lines—much longer than their paper counterparts. A more
reliable estimate of the additional effort involved in formal proofs,
the de Bruijn factor (Wiedijk, 2012), cleans and compresses files
before dividing the size of the code by the size of an informal
TEXsource. It thus avoids bias by semantically irrelevant differences
in the syntaxes of formalizations such as languages or code styles
using different lengths of lines or of identifiers. The de Bruijn factor
relating Proof #2 and its definitions (includingmax) to our Isabelle
code is 1.1; as our TEX source is more elaborate than usual, this is
lower than the typically observed factors of around four.
Fig. 1 depicts the files used in the proof. Those already in
Isabelle’s library aremarked by ellipses. Dotted ellipses denote files
containing general definitions and lemmas that we have added to
Isabelle’s library. Rectangles denote this paper’s auction-specific
files. Directed edges denote dependence, with the source code
being imported into the target code.
Vickrey.thy begins with vickreyA, which proves that truth telling
is weakly dominant in Vickrey auctions:
51 See https://github.com/formare/auctions/tree/master/isabelle/Auction for the
code.
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theorem vickreyA :
fixes N :: ‘‘participant set ’’ and v :: valuations and A :: single_good_auction
assumes val : ‘‘valuations N v’’
defines ‘‘b ≡ v’’
assumes spa : ‘‘second_price_auction A’’ and card_N : ‘‘card N > 1’’
shows ‘‘equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A’’
The fixes keyword applies the theorem to anyN , v and A of the given types. The type single_good_auction is defined as an input×output
relation, with the bidders and their bids as input, and a Boolean allocation vector and a vector of transfers as outcome.52 The valuations
type is defined elsewhere to be a vector of real numbers. The assumes keyword on the next line states that the theorem holds under an
assumption labelled val, namely that in the vector v of N real numbers, all numbers are non-negative (this defined at another place as the
definition of ‘valuations’).
Next, the defines declaration equates bids and valuations. The following assumes keyword introduces and labels further assumptions
(e.g. A is a second-price auction; N contains more than one bidder). The shows keyword states the theorem: N agents participating in
auction A, with valuations v and bids b (equated to valuations) yields an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
SingleGoodAuctionProperties.thy defines the equilibrium concept:
definition equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy ::
‘‘participant set ⇒ valuations ⇒ bids ⇒ single_good_auction ⇒ bool’’where
‘‘equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A ←→
valuations N v ∧ bids N b ∧ single_good_auction A ∧
(∀i ∈ N .
(∀whatever_bid . bids N whatever_bid −→
(let b′ = whatever_bid(i := b i)
in (∀x p x′ p′ . ((N,whatever_bid), (x, p)) ∈ A ∧ ((N, b′), (x′, p′)) ∈ A
−→ payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i) ≥ payoff (v i) (x i) (p i)))))’’
The definition’s second line declares the type of the equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy to be a (Boolean) predicatewhose arguments
are a set of participants, a valuation vector, a bid vector, and an auction.53 The definition’s body states that the predicate, given arguments
N , v, b and A, evaluates to true if and only if the remaining expression does. The expressions in the subsequent line ensure that all
arguments have admissible values. Similarly, our first step when introducing whatever_bid is to ensure that it is an admissible bid vector.
The whatever_bid(i := b i) notation then takes an arbitrary vector and replaces its ith component with i’s bid b i (which the theorem
equates to i’s valuation).54
We denote the outcome of an arbitrary bid (whatever_bid) by (x, p), while

x′, p′

denotes that of i’s original bid and arbitrary bids by
agents j ≠ i. To satisfy the definition of an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies, the outcome x′, p′ of i’s truthful bid must yield
a payoff no less than that resulting from an arbitrary bid. The let · · · in · · · notation55 introduces local abbreviations, which can only be
accessed within the in block; here, this makes the expression ((N, b′), (x′, p′)) ∈ Amore readable.
The code snippet below formalizes case 2b of Proof #2. It is declarative, resembling a textbook proof. Procedural proofs, by contrast,
prescribe tactics to apply, thus more resembling the process humans use to find proofs. In either case, each theorem creates a proof
obligation, or a goal; thesemay be broken into subgoals (e.g. by case distinction); the set of local proof obligations implied by these subgoals
are stored on a goal stack.
Proof #3.
1 proof−
2 (∗ · · · ∗)
3 {
4 fix i :: participant
5 assume i_range : ‘‘i ∈ N ’’
6 (∗ · · · ∗)
7 let ?b = ‘‘whatever_bid(i := b i)’’
8 (∗ · · · ∗)
9 have weak_dominance : ‘‘payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i) ≥ payoff (v i) (x i) (p i)’’
10 proof cases
11 assume non_alloc : ‘‘x′ i ≠ 1’’
12 with spa_pred′ i_range have ‘‘x′ i = 0’’ using spa_allocates_binary by blast
13 with spa_pred′ i_range have loser_payoff : ‘‘payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i) = 0’’
14 by (rule second_price_auction_loser_payoff )
52 This can be seen from expressions such as ((N, b′), (x′, p′)) ∈ A.
53 The A ⇒ B ⇒ C notation, referred to as currying, is equivalent to A× B → C , but is conceptually simpler as it does not require definition of a× operation.
54 The code snippet contains various instances of ‘‘.’’: these are separators that improve readability.
55 We use ‘‘· · · ’’ to distinguish the standard use of ellipses from Isabelle’s ‘‘. . . ’’ notation, whosemeaningwe introducewhen explaining line 30 of the following code snippet.
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15 have i_bid_at_most_second : ‘‘?b i ≤ ?b_max′’’
16 proof (rule ccontr)
17 assume ‘‘¬?thesis’’
18 then have ‘‘?b i > ?b_max′’’ by simp
19 with defined spa_pred′ i_range have ‘‘second_price_auction_winner N ?b x′ p′ i’’
20 by (simp add : only_max_bidder_wins)
21 with non_alloc show False
22 unfolding second_price_auction_winner_def
23 second_price_auction_winner_outcome_def by blast
24 qed
25 show ?thesis
26 proof cases
27 assume ‘‘x i ≠ 1’’
28 then have ‘‘x i = 0’’ by (rule spa_allocates_binary′)
29 with spa_pred i_range have ‘‘payoff (v i) (x i) (p i) = 0’’
30 by (rule second_price_auction_loser_payoff )
31 also have ‘‘... = payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i)’’ using loser_payoff ..
32 finally show ?thesis by (rule eq_refl)
33 next
34 (∗ · · · ∗)
35 qed
36 next
37 (∗ · · · ∗)
38 qed
39 }
40 (∗ · · · ∗)
41 qed

The proof keyword starts the proof. Invoked alone, Isabelle
would automatically select inference rules to apply. proof—
performs manual inference. Alternatively, one can specify existing
inference rules:
• proof cases (lines 10 and 26) makes a case distinction; analysis
of each case concludes by showing that the desired thesis holds;
qed clears the goal stack; next begins the next case.
• proof (rule ccontr) (line 16) undertakes proof by contradiction,
culminating in show False.
The proof considers an arbitrary but fixed participant i, which is
introduced locally with the fix keyword, and assumed to be in the
admissible range N for bidders.56
The have statements establish local facts, generating local
proof obligations, which have to be discharged by corresponding
proofs. Here, the cases proof establishes that ui (. . . , vi, . . .) ≥
ui (. . . , bi, . . .). This proof makes use of further facts, omitted
to keep the snippet readable: spa_pred and spa_pred′ state that
((N,whatever_bid), (x, p)) and ((N, ?b), (x′, p′)) respectively are
in an (input, outcome) relationship of a second price auction with
each other.57 defined states that a vector with one component per
element of the (finite) set N has a well-defined maximum compo-
nent.
Both from and using introduce facts to discharge the have
obligations. The by keyword invokes an automated proof method,
instead of discharging proof obligations by explicit declarative
means. Isabelle thus combines ATP and ITP methods.
1. simp (lines 18 and 20) simplifies (e.g. x ∧ x = x) the statement
to be proved. Line 20 supplies a simplification rule of our own,
only_max_bidder_wins .
2. blast (lines 12 and 13) ‘‘is (in principle) a complete proof proce-
dure for first-order formulas’’ (Nipkow, 2015). In practice, blast
either succeeds, fails, or – giving a practical example of semi-
decidability – runs until the user cancels it.
3. rule (lines 14, 16, 28, 30 and 32) applies the given lemma as an
inference rule. In line 31, ‘‘..’’ abbreviates by rule, which auto-
matically applies a matching inference rule.
While interactively developing the proof, we employed the try
and try0 commands, which apply a range of automated methods,
to find the most appropriate proof methods. Automated calls can
always be replaced by explicit declarative steps; Isabelle’s Sledge-
hammer tool (Blanchette and Paulson, 2015) can sometimes pro-
vide them automatically.
The assume · · · then have constructions (lines 17 and 18, and
27 and 28) list assumptions then state the proof obligations. Line
17’s identifier ?thesis refers to the proof obligation at the proof’s
current level of reasoning.
Lines 22–23’s unfolding also performs substitutions, replacing
stated concepts’ names with the bodies of their definitions. Unlike
abbreviations with ?, the latter are semantic definitions, of which
the reasoner make use (e.g. second_price_auction_winner_def is re-
stated in terms of i ∈ N , i ∈ argmax b, . . . ).
Lines 29–32’s have · · · also have · · · finally show construc-
tion allows chains of reasoning with equality before discharging a
proof obligation: the ‘‘. . . ’’ following the also have are replaced by
56 In Isabelle, the descriptive form of a verb (e.g. fixes, assumes or shows) are often used when stating theorems, while their imperative counterparts (e.g. fix, assume or
show) are used locally in proofs.
57 Isabelle syntactically substitutes identifiers starting with ? by other, usually more complex expressions before checking a proof step. Syntactic substitution is performed,
for example, by the preprocessor of many programming languages, allowing the programmer to use shorthand designations rather than writing complicated expressions in
full. It is distinct from the semantic equation of two variables, as in ‘‘b ≡ v’’.
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the right hand side of the previous have statement. In line 31, this
establishes that i receives zero given valuation vi and either (x, p),
or

x′, p′

.
5. Discussion
The decade since the mechanized reasoning community be-
came interested in economic applications has seen rapid progress.
When Nipkow reported on his formalization of Arrow’s theorem,
he agreed that ‘‘[s]ocial choice theory turns out to be perfectly suit-
able for mechanical theorem proving’’, but felt that it was ‘‘unclear
if [it] will lead to new insights into either social choice theory or
theorem proving’’ (Nipkow, 2009). However, that very year Tang
and Lin (2009) used mechanized reasoning to discover a new the-
orem that subsumes Arrow’s, which Chatterjee and Sen (2014) be-
lieved to be novel, and unlikely to have been foundwith traditional
methods. Shortly thereafter, Geist and Endriss (2011) contributed
their 84 impossibility theorems.
If mechanized reasoning is to make further inroads into eco-
nomics it must be sensitive to a number of concerns. First,
economics has no proofs of comparable complexity or length to
significant results in modern mathematics. Thus, the question of
whether a proof will exceed the capability of human theorists to
verify is less of a concern than in mathematics. Further, it is un-
clear that there have been any disastrous cases of mistaken proofs
within economics; instead, our greater errors likely result from
poor modelling in the first place, and coding or data errors in
econometrics.
Second, even whenmechanized reasoners have helped identify
new results, economic theoristsmay dismiss themas unmotivated,
non-transparent or lacking insight.58 Even, however, in the worst
case, we believe that a stock of poorly-motivated, non-transparent
theorems generated blindly by computer provide cases for us to
think about and reason with: the presence of the intermediate in-
dependence axiom in all of the larger impossibility theorems found
by Geist and Endriss (2011) should provide precisely the sort of
hunch that sets us sharpening our pencils.
We close by suggesting some further possible applications of
mechanized reasoning to economic problems.
First, there are open problems in auction theory that seem
amenable to solution by computation (rather than ‘reasoning’).
For example, the simplest formulation of optimal multi-object
auctions (q.v. Armstrong, 2000) defines a linear programming
problem that quickly becomes too large to solve manually as
the number of items increases.59 As efficient algorithms exist for
solving linear programming problems, automated mechanism de-
sign (q.v. Conitzer and Sandholm, 2003) has already begun to ad-
dress the purely computational aspects of optimal mechanism
design. As formal methods can be used to verify the results of com-
putations (q.v. Gonthier, 2008; Hales et al., 2015), proofs in auto-
matedmechanismdesign could also be verified by formalmethods.
Second, we believe that the exhaust-then-induct technique pi-
oneered by Tang and Lin (2009), and developed by Geist and En-
driss (2011), offers the promise of automating search for theorems
in other areas of economic theory. The formal similarities between
social choice and matching theory – including a reliance on dis-
crete objects – suggests that this technique could be applied di-
rectly to the latter. Although auction theory appears richer in its
use of continuous objects (prices), there is a small literature estab-
lishing results by induction (Chew and Serizawa, 2007; Morimoto
and Serizawa, 2015; Adachi, 2014; Kato et al., 2015); the possibility
of coupling their induction steps with computational exhaustion
has not been explored.
However these tools are applied within economics, it is hard to
imagine them not becoming more important, as the tools them-
selves become faster and easier to use, as they gain acceptance
within the pure mathematics community, and as the mechanized
reasoning community seeks more applications for them.
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